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Abstract
Modular methods to transformByzantine consensus protocols into ones that are fast and com-
munication efficient in the common cases are presented. Small and short protocol segments called
layers are custom designed to optimize performance in the common case. When composed with
a Byzantine consensus protocol of choice, they allow considerable control over the tradeoff in the
combined protocol’s behavior in the presence of failures and its performance in their absence.
When runs are failure free in the common case, the resulting protocols decide in two rounds and
require 2nt bits of communication. For the common case assumption that all processors propose 1
and no failures occur, we show a transformation in which decisions are made in one round, and no
bits of communication are exchanged. The resulting protocols achieve better common-case com-
plexity than all existing Byzantine consensus protocols. Finally, in the rare instances in which the
common case does not occur, a small cost is added to the complexity of the original consensus proto-
col being transformed. The key ingredient of these layers that allows both time and communication
efficiency in the common case is the use of silent confirmation rounds, which are rounds where con-
siderable relevant information can be obtained in the absence of any communication whatsoever.
“I am prepared for the worst, but hope for the best”
Benjamin Disraeli
1 Introduction
Reaching agreement on values is a fundamental problem in distributed systems. While voting is a nat-
ural mechanism for this purpose, it is not implementable when failures are possible. In their seminal
paper Pease, Shostak and Lamport [31] defined the Byzantine consensus problem (originally called
Interactive Consistency) in 1980. Broadly speaking, Byzantine consensus considers the problem of
reaching agreement among a group of n parties, up to t of which can be Byzantine faults and deviate
from the protocol arbitrarily. Pease, Shostak and Lamport presented a protocol that solves the prob-
lem in t+ 1 rounds whenever n > 3t, and proved that no solution for n ≤ 3t exists [31, 27]. Fischer
and Lynch later showed that t+ 1 rounds are necessary in the worst-case run of any Byzantine con-
sensus protocol [14]. In the original solution of [31, 27], processes never decide before the end of t+1
rounds. Moreover, each process sends an exponential number of bits of information (and performs an
exponential amount of computation) in every execution. The authors leave as an open problem the
design of more efficient solutions to Byzantine consensus, and the quest for efficient solutions to this
problem has received a great deal of attention over the last four decades. For a recent partial survey,
see [2]. Currently available solutions present a variety of options for trading off the time complexity
of Byzantine consensus protocols, their communication costs, and the fault-tolerance ratio (the ratio
between n and t) that they provide.
In the early days of the subject, the Byzantine failure model was considered somewhat esoteric
and unrealistic, and so it was not considered cost-effective to tolerate such failures in most practical
systems. This has changed over the years, however. The critical role played by distributed sys-
tems nowadays and the increasing abundance of cyber threats have made Byzantine-fault tolerance
practically relevant [8, 22].
Whereas the damage thatmalicious cyber attacks may cause is considerable and tolerating Byzan-
tine faults is important, such faults are typically rare. Therefore, a system that incurs high costs only
in the rare cases when these faults occur and is cheaper in all other cases, is desirable from a practical
point of view. Dolev et al. [11], introduced “early stopping” solutions that are adaptive to the number
of actual failures f in an execution. Early stopping protocols often decide after min{t + 1, f + 2}
rounds [2, 11, 29, 30]. In practice, the case of f = 0 in which no failures occur is typically much more
common than all other cases. We contend that optimizing Byzantine consensus for f = 0 rather than
for general f < t may be worthwhile. Indeed, well-known practical solutions to the state replication
problem have focused on optimizing performance for runs in which no failure occurs (see, e.g., [8, 22]).
In this paper we investigate the design of Byzantine consensus protocols that are especially efficient
in this important common case. We show that optimizing for f = 0 instead of for any f yields simpler
and more efficient solutions.
Protocols that are highly efficient in the common case can make a significant contribution to
the effective operations of a distributed system [8, 1, 28, 7, 23, 26, 18, 22, 16, 17]. If failures
are rare, then the system’s performance in the common, failure-free, case is much more practi-
cally relevant than its performance when failures occur. Nevertheless, a protocol designer may
prefer the tradeoffs offered by a particular solution in the presence of failures. Our goal is to
provide tools that will guarantee excellent behavior in the common case, and will allow the pro-
tocol designer to switch to her favorite protocol when failures occur. Intuitively, this is achieved
as follows. Given an arbitrarily chosen binary consensus protocol, which we refer to as the basic
protocol, we prepend a layer consisting of a very small number of rounds to the basic protocol.
The combined protocol executes this layer, and reaches consensus quickly and efficiently in the
common case. If it has not reached consensus, execution transfers to the basic protocol, which
proceeds to achieve consensus as usual. Even in the rare uncommon case, the prepended layer
does not increase the asymptotic communication cost of the basic protocol, and it adds only a
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small constant number of rounds to the running time. Turpin and Coan have similarly designed
an initial protocol layer that transforms a binary consensus protocol into a multi-valued proto-
col [33].
The main contributions of this paper are:
• We present an optimal optimizing layer L1 for the stronger common case assumption that all
processes propose 1 and no failures occur. In the common case, it decides after one round, and
uses no communication whatsoever. The use of L1 makes consensus essentially free in this com-
mon case. In the presence of failures, L1 adds one round and a total of n
2 bits of communication
to the basic protocol.
• For the common case in which no failures occur, we present two optimizing layers. One of them,
denoted L2, decides in (optimal) 2 rounds and uses 2nt bits in the common case. All previous
consensus protocols that decide in 2 rounds when f = 0 require Ω(n3) bits (cf. [5, 2]). The
layer L2 adds 3 rounds and less than 4n
2 bits to the basic protocol when failures occur. The
other layer, L3, costs one more round but it uses half the communication of L2 in the common
case. The communication cost of L3 in the common case is 24 times better than that of the best
protocol in the literature ([5]), and is within a factor of 4 from the lower bound of nt/4 ([10, 18]).
• Whereas decisions in binary consensus protocols are often biased in favor of a predetermined
value or in favor values of particular processes, our layers decide on the majority value in the
common case. They convert consensus into a fair vote in all but relatively rare cases.
• A key ingredient that improves the communication-efficiency of the layers are rounds that, in
the failure-free case, convey useful global information without communication. We call them
silent confirmation rounds. We formalize silent confirmation rounds, and present a theorem
that demonstrates how silent confirmation rounds, the null-messages of [25] and the silent choirs
of [16] all emerge from the same principles.
Using one of our layers, the protocol designer is free to choose her favorite base protocol. Typical
considerations for such a choice may involve the desired tradeoff between the time, communication
costs and resilience of the base protocol in the presence of failures. Here are some such tradeoffs
provided by existing binary consensus protocols for the Byzantine failure model. The coordinated
traversal protocol of [29] is an early stopping protocol that sends O(n3) bits per round and tolerates
t < n/8 Byzantine failures. Abraham and Dolev present an early-stopping protocol that tolerates
t < n/3 faults, and uses polynomial communication (for an unstated large polynomial, possiblyO(n8)
orO(n9) bits). Kowalski andMoste´faoui present a protocol for t < n/3 that decides in t+1 rounds and
uses O(n3 log n) bits, except that executing it requires exponential computation. Deciding in more
than t+1 rounds has allowed solutions with better communication complexity for t < n/3. A protocol
in [4] achieves 14n2 bit complexity with t+ o(t) rounds. An adaptation of a protocol by Hadzilacos
and Halpern in [18] can be made to cost only n2(t+1)/4 bits and decide after 3 rounds in failure-free
executions. The Early Stopping Phase King and Queen protocols of Berman, Garay and Perry in [5],
focused on reducing communication complexity and achieved outstanding results of n2 bits per round
complexity. The Phase King protocol has optimal resilience and decides after min{4(f +2), 4(t+1)}
rounds, while Phase Queen is faster and decides after min{2(f + 2), 2(t + 1)} rounds, but it has a
reduced resilience of t < t/4. In all cases, adding a cost of O(n2) bits by running any of our layers as
a preliminary stage does not increase the asymptotic communication complexity.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section formally defines our system
model. In Section 3 we present common-case optimizers for Byzantine consensus. Sections 3.1 to 3.3
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describe our three main layers and discusses their properties. Section 4 discusses and formalizes silent
communication rounds, which are a key element in reducing communication costs in our solutions.
Finally, concluding remarks are provided in Section 5. Proofs of all statements appear either in the
main text or in the Appendix.
2 Model and Preliminaries
In the consensus problem, each process i starts with some initial value vi ∈ V , and all correct pro-
cesses need to reach a common decision. All runs of a consensus protocol are required to satisfy the
following conditions:
Consensus:
Decision: Every correct process must eventually decide,
Agreement: All correct processes make the same decision, and
Validity: If all correct processes have the same initial value, then all correct processes decide
on this value.
When V = {0, 1} the problem is called binary consensus, and when |V | > 2 we refer to it as multi-
valued consensus. A Byzantine consensus protocol is a consensus protocol that can tolerate up to t
byzantine failures per run.
2.1 Model of Computation
We consider the standard synchronous message-passing model with Byzantine failures. We assume
a set P = {0, 1, . . . , n − 1} of n > 2 processes. Each pair of processes is connected by a two-way
communication link, and for each message the receiver knows the identity of the sender. All processes
share a discrete global clock that starts at time 0 and advances by increments of one. Communication
in the system proceeds in a sequence of rounds, with round m+ 1 taking place between time m and
time m + 1, for m ≥ 0. A message sent at time m (i.e., in round m + 1) from a process i to j will
reach j by time m + 1, i.e., the end of round m + 1. In every round, each process performs local
computations, sends a set of messages to other processes, and finally receives messages sent to it by
other processes during the same round.
At any given time m ≥ 0, a process is in a well-defined local state . For simplicity, we assume
that the local state of a process i consists of its initial value vi, the current timem, and the sequence
of the actions that i has performed (including the messages it has sent and received) up to that time.
In particular, its local state at time 0 has the form (vi, 0, {}). A protocol describes what messages
a process sends and what decisions it takes, as a deterministic function of its local state. Correct
(as appose to faulty) process follows the protocol’s instructions. A faulty process, however, behaves
arbitrarily and is not restricted to follow the protocol. In particular, it can act maliciously and send
bogus messages in an attempt to sabotage the correct operation of the system. In a given execution
a process is either correct or faulty, it cannot be both.
We will consider the design of protocols that are required to withstand up to t failures. Thus,
given 1 ≤ t < n, we denote by γt the model described above in which it is guaranteed that no more
than t processes are faulty in any given run. We assume that a protocol P has access to the values
of n and t, typically passed to P as parameters.
A run is a description of a (possibly infinite) execution of the system. We call a set of runs R
a system . We will be interested in systems of the form RP = R(P, γ
t) consisting of all runs of a
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given protocol P in which no more than t processes are faulty. Observe that a protocol P solves
Byzantine consensus in the model γt if and only if every run of RP satisfies the Decision, Agreement
and Validity conditions described above. Given a run r and a time m, we denote the local state of
process i at timem in run r by ri(m). Notice that a process i can be in the same local state in different
runs of the same protocol. Since the current time m is represented in the local state ri(m), however,
r(m) = r′(m′) can hold only if m = m′.
2.2 Indistinguishability and Knowledge
We shall say that two runs r and r′ are indistinguishable to process i at time m if ri(m) = r
′
i(m).
We denote this by r ≈mi r
′. Notice that since we assume that correct processes follow deterministic
protocols, if r ≈mi r
′ then a correct process i is guaranteed to perform the same actions at time m in
both r and r′. Problem specifications typically impose restrictions on actions, based on properties of
the run. Moreover, since the actions that a correct process performs are a function of its local state,
the restrictions can depend on properties of other runs as well.
For example, the Agreement condition implies that a correct process i cannot decide on v at
time m in a run r if there is an indistinguishable run r′ ≈mi r in which some correct process decides
on u 6= v. Similarly, by the Validity condition a correct process i cannot decide on v if there is a run r′
that is indistinguishable from r (to i at time m) in which all correct processes have the same initial
value u 6= v. These examples illustrate how indistinguishability can inhibit actions — performing an
action can be prohibited because of what may be true at indistinguishable runs.
Rather than considering when actions are prohibited, we can choose to consider what is required
in order for an action to be allowed by the specification. To this end, we can view the Agreement
condition as implying that a correct process i is allowed to decide on v at timem in r only if in every
run r′ ≈mi r there is no correct process that decides otherwise.
This is much stronger than stating that no correct process decides otherwise in the run r itself,
of course. Roughly speaking, the stronger statement is true because at time m process i cannot tell
whether it is in r or in any of the runs r′ ≈mi r. When this condition holds, we say that i knows that
all values are 1. Generally, it will be convenient to define the dual of indistinguishability, i.e., what is
true at all indistinguishable runs, as what the process knows. More formally, following in the spirit
of [19, 13], we proceed to define knowledge in our distributed systems as follows.1
Definition 1 (Knowledge). Fix a system R, a run r ∈ R, a process i and a fact ϕ. We say that Kiϕ
(which we read as “process i knows ϕ”) holds at time m in r iff ϕ is true of all runs r′ ∈ R such that
r′ ≈mi r.
We shall focus on knowledge of facts that can be extracted from processes local states, their con-
junctions and disjunctions. We call a fact that is implied by i’s local state an i-local fact, and denote
them by ϕi, ψ, etc. In particular, facts such as “vi = x” (i’s initial value is x), “i received message µ
from j” (in the current run), and “i has decided v” (in the current run), are all examples of i-local
facts. We use Boolean operators such as ¬ (Not), ∧ (And), and ∨ (Or) freely in the sequel.
Notice that knowledge is defined with respect to a given system R. Often, the system is clear
from context and is not stated explicitly. Definition 1 immediately implies the so-called Knowledge
property: If Kiϕ holds at (any) time m in r, then r satisfies ϕ.
1We introduce just enough of the theory of knowledge to support the analysis in this paper. For more details, see [13].
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3 Common-case Optimizers
In this section we describe methods that transform Byzantine consensus protocols into ones that are
fast and communication efficient in the common case. We use a modular approach similar to that
of [33]. We prepend a few preliminary rounds to an existing consensus protocol that the designer can
choose, called the base protocol. In the common case, the base protocol is never used, and consensus
is achieved with relative ease. Otherwise, the computation transfers to the base protocol after a small
number of rounds and relatively efficient communication. The behavior of the composed protocol in
the rare uncommon case is determined by that of the base protocol.
Throughout the paper we use the following notations. Given a protocolP and a layer L, we denote
the composition of L and P by CC = L ⊙ P. In figures depicting a layer we use a dashed underline
to mark a line that is the only command in its round that the executing process will perform in the
common case. We depict the transition to execute a base protocol by painting a box around the base
protocol as in line 07 of Figure 1.
3.1 1 Round
The first layer, which we denote by L1, is optimized for the more specific unanimous common case
assumption, where in the common case all processes propose 1 and no failures occur. Optimizing
for the unanimous common case is typical in solutions to atomic commitment in the database liter-
ature [6, 12], and is also apparent in the weak Byzantine generals problem of [24]. In the common
case, the layer L1 ensures fast decisions – after one round – and uses 0 bits of communication. This
provides fault-tolerance with negligible costs in the common case.
Roughly speaking, L1 is structured as follows. In the first round, a process i sends a one-bit
message to all processes if vi = 0, and remains silent otherwise. A process that receives no message
in the first round is informed that all correct processes started with 1. A process decides 1 and halts
if it receives no message in the first round. Otherwise it will participate in the base protocol. It can
decide 1 if it receives fewer than t+ 1 messages in the first round. The base protocol will determine
the decision value in all other cases. In the common case, L1 decides at the end of the first round,
and sends no messages. In any case, L1 only affects the first round and sends at most n
2 bits.
time 0
(01) if vi = 1 then be silent
(02) else send ‘err ’ to all % vi = 0 %
time 1 and beyond
(03) if received no ‘err ’ then decide(1); halt
(04) if received at most t ‘err ’ messages then decide(1)
(05) if received at most 2t ‘err ’ messages then esti ← 1
(06) else esti ← vi
(07) dec ← Base.Protocol(esti)
(08) if undecided after time 1 then decide(dec)
Figure 1: L1 – A layer for process i, optimized for the unanimous common case.
Theorem 1. Let k ≥ 3 and let Base.Protocol be a binary consensus protocol for n > kt processes.
Then CC1 = L1 ⊙ Base.Protocol is a binary consensus protocol in which
1. In the unanimous common case, decisions occur after 1 round and no messages are sent, while
2. In the other cases, at most n2 bits are sent and 1 round elapses before reverting to the base
protocol.
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Proof. The proof of Theorem 1 appears in Appendix B, as do those of all statements that are not
proved in the main body of the paper.
3.2 2 Rounds
The unanimous common case for whichL1 was designed is a very strong assumption. Inmany settings
it is natural to consider the common case to be a failure-free execution. The layer L2 optimizes binary
consensus solutions for failure-free executions.2
Roughly speaking, L2 works as follows: A large committee consisting of 2t+1 processes is defined
a priori (we call it the greater Sanhedrin, or Sanhedrin, for short). In the first round, all processes
inform the greater Sanhedrin of their initial values. Each member of the Sanhedrin then computes a
majority of the votes it received and sends a recommended value to all processes accordingly. If no
failures occur, the recommendations of the Sanhedrin are all the same, and a process that receives
an identical recommendation from everyone decides on this recommendation. In the common case
execution everyone can decide after two rounds. In the third round, a process that has decided re-
mains quiet, while a process that received conflicting recommendations asks for help. In the common
case this round serves as a silent confirmation round for the fact “all correct processes have decided”,
a concept that will be formalized and explained in Section 4. A process that has decided at time 2
and receives no help request by time 3 can halt since it knows that all correct processes have decided.
Otherwise it will participate in the base protocol to assist processes who may have not decided yet.
Observe that in the common case all members of the Sanhedrin receive the same values in the
first round. In L2 such a member recommends the majority value among the ones it received in the
first round. Hence, in a failure-free round, everyone will decide on the majority value.
In order to improve the performance of L2 in its worst-case common case executions, we use a
technique due to [3]: In each of the first two rounds, in order to broadcast a binary value b ∈ {0, 1}
to a set of processes, a process i will inform half of the processes about b by sending them the value,
and the other half by sending them no message. (See lines 02 and 03 in the first round, and lines
07 and 08 in the second round.) This halves the number of bits required, but results in a slightly
more cumbersome algorithm. In Figure 2 recipients are partitioned according to parity of their IDs
(Even or Odd), but any other balanced division works equally well. Layer L2 uses the majority voting
functionMAJ(·) : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}, defined as
MAJ ,
{
1 if at least n
2
votes are 1
0 otherwise
}
.
Theorem 2. Let k ≥ 3 and let Base.Protocol be a binary consensus protocol for n > kt processes.
Then CC2 = L2 ⊙ Base.Protocol is a binary consensus protocol in which
1. In failure-free runs, decisions occur after 2 rounds and at most 2n(t+1) bits are communicated,
while
2. When failures occur, at most 2n(t + 1) + n2 bits are sent and 3 rounds elapse before reverting
to the base protocol.
3. In the common case, CC2 decides on the majority value.
3.3 3 Rounds
L2 sends approximately 2nt bits in the common case. In this section we present L3 that cuts the
communication costs in half to nt bits, by including one additional round.3 The ideas underlying
2Due to space limitations the full pseudocode of L2 is presented in Figure 2 in Appendix A.
3Again, the full pseudocode of L3 is presented in Figure 3 in Appendix A.
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the design of the 3-round layer L3 are similar to those of L2. A committee of t + 1 processes is a
priori defined (this time we call it the smaller Council). In the first round all processes inform the
council of their initial values, half in silence and half by messages. Each member of the council then
calculates a majority on the votes and sends a recommendation to all processes accordingly. (Again,
to half by silence and to the other half by messages.) If no failures occur, the members of the council
make identical recommendations. This time, in the third round, a process that receives identical
recommendations does not decide but uses the recommendation as its estimation and remains quiet.
A process that receives conflicting recommendations sets its estimation to be its initial proposal and
sends a message indicating that an error occurred. A process for which the third round appears
silent discovers that all correct processes also received identical recommendations, and since one of
the committee members must be correct, the recommendations they received are the same as the one
it received. Consequently, a process that receives no messages in the third round, decides at time 3
on its estimation. In the common case execution no messages are sent in round 3, and every process
decides at time 3. Round 4 is dedicated to obtaining the knowledge that “all correct processes have
decided”. Thus, at time 3, a process that has decided remains quiet, while an undecided process asks
for help. If no help request arrives by time 4 a process halts, otherwise it turns to the base protocol.
In the common case all processes decide at time 3, remain quiet in round 4, and halt at time 4.
Theorem 3. Let k ≥ 3 and let Base.Protocol be a binary consensus protocol for n > kt processes.
Then CC3 = L3 ⊙ Base.Protocol is a binary consensus protocol in which
1. In failure-free runs, decisions occur after 3 rounds and at most n(t+1.5) bits are communicated,
while
2. When failures occur, at most n(t+1.5) + 2n2 bits are sent and 4 rounds elapse before reverting
to the base protocol.
3. In the common case, CC3 decides on the majority value.
The communication cost of the 3-round layer L3 is 4 times the best-known lower bound of Ω(nt/4)
bits for this case from [10, 18]. The previously best-known communication behavior is by the Early
Stopping Phase King protocol of [5], which requires up to 8n2 bits, and takes up to 8 rounds to decide
in the common case. L3 achieves a 24-fold improvement in bit complexity, while also reducing the
decision time (from 8 to 3 rounds). In addition, the added costs in the uncommon cases are only 4
rounds and a negligible amount of bits. Thereby, this layer offers practical systems considerable cost
reductions for a minor overhead.
3.4 Behavior in Uncommon Cases
The layers we have introduced all guarantee that consensus is obtained in the common case without
the base protocol ever being called into action. In the uncommon case, if any of the correct processes
reverts to the base protocol in order to determine its decision value, it first alerts all correct processes,
and they all participate in the execution of the base protocol. There is a third possibility, in which all
correct processes have decided, but a malicious process falsely alerts some of the correct processes.
This can initiate an execution of the base protocol with fewer than n− t correct participants. For the
purposes of our discussion in this section, we refer to these as redundant executions. Since the correct-
ness of the base protocol may rely on the existence of sufficientlymany correct participants, this execu-
tion might, in general, fail to satisfy the conditions for consensus. As this can only happen if all correct
processes have already decided before entering the base protocol, it will not affect the correctness of
our solution.4 It can, however, affect the time and communication costs in redundant executions.
4Indeed, this is why such executions of the base protocol are called redundant.
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In most popular consensus protocols in the literature, redundant executions, in which a subset
of the processes are initially crashed and at most t act maliciously, do not have greater time and
communication costs than “standard” executions of the protocol. If the protocol designer chooses
to use a consensus protocol P for which redundant executions may be costly, she can often slightly
modify the protocol to alleviate this cost. For example, recall that a correct process i participates
in a redundant execution only if it has decided before entering the base protocol. All of our layers
ensure that, in this case, all correct processes participating in the protocol propose the same value
as i does. The designer can therefore have a correct process that has decided before entering P simply
stop executing P once it observes a scenario that is inconsistent with all correct processes proposing
the same initial value as its own. Another useful observation is that in many consensus protocols,
including all of the ones quoted in the Introduction, all messages that are sent by correct processes,
are sent to everyone. The designer can thus safely modify such a protocol P in the following manner:
Whenever a process i receives no messages from a process j, it simulates the actions that j would have
performed under P if it had the same initial value and received the same messages as i did. Process i
then acts as if it received the messages that the simulated j would have sent it. The costs of a correct
process in an execution of the modified protocol in which f ≤ t processes are faulty will not exceed
those of P under the same circumstances.
3.5 Multi-valued Consensus
In multi-valued consensus, |V | ≥ 3 and the splitting technique used by L2 and L3 for broadcasting
values needs to bemodified. The resulting technique becomesmore cumbersome and less efficient. We
design two layers L′2 and L
′
3 for multi-valued consensus that closely resemble L2 and L3, respectively.
The new layers differ from the original ones in two minor ways. One is that the majority computation
on line 05 of the original layers is replaced by a plurality computation, which chooses a value that
appears most frequently. The other difference is that the broadcasting of values is implemented in
a more straightforward manner: In the first and second rounds, processes encode by silence only a
common proposal v˜i and decision d˜ec, while broadcasting the rest of the values explicitly. A full
description of the resulting layers appears in Appendix C. We can show:
Theorem 4. Let k ≥ 3, let Base.Protocol be a multi-valued consensus protocol for n > kt, and let
L ∈ {L2, L3}. Then CC
′ = L′ ⊙ Base.Protocol is a multi-valued consensus protocol in which
1. In failure-free runs of L′2 (resp. L
′
3) decisions occur after 2 (resp. 3) rounds and at most
4n(t+ 1) log2 |V | (resp. 2n(t+ 1) log2 |V |) bits are communicated, while
2. When failures occur, at most 4n(t+1) log2 |V |+n
2 (resp. 2n(t+1) log2 |V |+2n
2) bits are sent
and 3 (resp. 4) rounds elapse before reverting to the base protocol.
3. In the common case, CC′ decides on a plurality value.
4 Silent Confirmation Rounds
In the first round of L1, no communication occurs in the common case. Similarly, the third round
ofL2 is silent in the common case. InL3, both the third and the fourth round are silent in the common
case executions. This is no coincidence. In all of these cases, we use the fact that a process receives no
messages to convey relevant information at a small communication cost. In this section we formalize
the role that such silent rounds play in transmitting information.
The idea is as follows. Suppose that we are interested in discovering whether a global property of
the correct processes holds. In particular, we consider a “system milestone” that is composed of local
milestones, one for every process. Examples of such a milestone are “all values are 1” or “all correct
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processes have successfully decided.” Formally, we define the local milestone of a process i to be the
i-local fact ϕi, and the system milestone to be ϕ¯c ,
∧
correct i
ϕi. Information about such milestones can
be conveyed in silence as follows.
Definition 2. For every i ∈ P, let ϕi be an i-local fact in the system RP = R(P, γ
t). Denote
ϕ¯c ,
∧
correct i
ϕi, and fix some time m ≥ 0. We say that P implements a silent confirmation round
for ϕ¯c (scr(ϕ¯c) for short) in round m+ 1 if in every run r ∈ RP , each correct i ∈ P sends messages
to everyone in round m+ 1 in case ϕi does not hold at time m.
Theorem 5. Assume that P implements an scr(ϕ¯c) in round m+1, and fix a run r of P. A process j
that receives no messages whatsoever in round m+1 knows at timem+1 that ϕ¯c was true at timem.
Proof. Suppose that the assumptions hold and that j does not receive any roundm+1 message in a
run r ∈ RP . We show that j knows at timem+1 in r that ϕ¯c was true at timem. Fix some run r
′ ∈ RP
that is j-indistinguishable from r at timem+1. By definition, j does not receive any roundm+1mes-
sage in r′ (otherwise it would distinguish r′ from r). The fact that j receives no roundm+1 messages
in r′ means in particular that no correct process sent j any roundm+1message. Since P implements
an scr(ϕ¯c) in roundm+ 1, we have by Definition 2 that ϕi holds at time m in r
′ for all correct i ∈ P.
Consequently, ϕ¯c also holds at timem in r
′. Since this is true for every run r′ ∈ RP s.t. r
′ ≈m+1j r, it
immediately follows by Definition 1 that j knows at time m+ 1 in r that ϕ¯c was true at timem.
As suggested above, silent confirmation rounds are a key ingredient in the efficiency of our layers.
They allow processes to obtain crucial information quickly and at no message costs in the common
case. In Figure 1, by not sending a message if vi = 1 in line 01, L1 implements an scr for the fact
ϕ¯c , “all correct processes propose 1”. Theorem 5 thus guarantees that a correct process can de-
cide and halt in line 03 because it knows that ϕ¯c holds. Layer L2 implements an scr for the fact
all decided ,“all correct processes have decided” in round 3 (line 09 in Figure 2). In the common
case execution of L2 round 3 is completely silent and a process learns that all decided at time 2.
The fact that all correct processes have decided implies that there is no need to execute the base
protocol to reach consensus. Hence, a process that knows that everyone has decided can safely halt.
This is exactly what happens on line 14 of L2, following a silent round. L3 uses two silent confirmation
rounds, thereby achieving even better communication efficiency. A round 3 scr for “all received a
unanimous recommendation” is implemented in line 09 of Figure 3, which is followed by a round 4
scr for all decided in line 11.
Silent confirmation rounds are not restricted to this paper alone. Indeed, the Atomic Commit-
ment protocols in [16] use silent confirmation rounds to gain communication efficiency. Moreover,
broadcast-based protocols for radio networks use such rounds to overcome possiblemalicious behavior
(see, e.g., [9, 15]). Silent confirmation rounds can be used to improve solutions to other distributed
problems. For example, a variety of protocols in the literature make use of long silent phases consist-
ing of (t + 1) rounds or more to verify that a specific milestone has been reached (e.g., [17, 3, 18]).
The time complexity of these protocols in the common case can easily be reduced by employing a
silent confirmation round instead.
4.1 A General View
Both this paper and [16] present silence-based primitives and use them to aid the design of efficient
protocols. This section provides a broader view on the uses of silence and primitives based on it. We
first give a generalization that gathers such primitives under the same roof and clarifies their relation.
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Roughly speaking, we wish to capture the general concept of a protocol purposely not sending mes-
sages in order to transmit relevant information. We now modify the definition of a silent confirmation
round, by making the set of senders and the set of receivers parameters. We proceed as follows.
Definition 3 (S-T silent broadcast). Let γ be a synchronous message-passing context in which correct
processes follow the protocol, and let RP = R(P, γ). Fix two sets of processes S, T ⊆ P. For every i ∈
S, let ϕi be an i-local fact in the system RP . Denote ϕ¯
S
c ,
∧
correct i∈S
ϕi, and fix some time m ≥ 0. We
say that P implements a silent broadcast of ϕ¯Sc from S to T in roundm+1, if in every run r ∈ RP ,
each correct i ∈ S sends messages to each j ∈ T during roundm+1 in case ϕi does not hold at timem.
In an analogousmanner toTheorem 5, anS-T silent broadcast guarantees the information transfer
property described below.
Theorem 6. Assume that P implements silent broadcast of ϕ¯Sc from S to T in round m+ 1, and fix
a run r of P. A process j ∈ T that receives no messages from S in round m+ 1 knows at time m+ 1
that ϕ¯Sc was true at time m.
Sketch of Proof. The proof is completely analogous to that of Theorem 5, except that Definition 3 is
used instead of Definition 2. 
Recall that Definition 3 explicitly generalizes Definition 2. Indeed, a silent confirmation round is
an instance of a silent broadcast from S to T , for S = T = P. Since, in addition, γt is a synchronous
message-passing context, Theorem 6 implies in particular Theorem 5. With appropriate choices for
the parameters S and T , silent broadcast can capture other familiar methods for information transfer
using silence. Thus, for example, a null message from i to j in the sense of Lamport [25] is a silent
broadcast from S = {i} to T = {j}. Another example is the silent choir from [16] which is a silent
broadcast of ψ ,
∧
correct i∈S
Ki(vj = 1) from a carefully defined set S. The sender set S in that case
is chosen to be large enough as to ensure that it contains a correct process. The fact ψ thus implies
that Ki(vj = 1) holds for at least one correct process and thus vj = 1 must be true. Although [16]
assumes a crash failure model, their notion of a silent choir applies equally well to the byzantine
model addressed in this paper. In an analogous fashion, we can use the notion of S-T silent broadcast
to define silent choirs in the “Cores and Survivor sets” model of [20]. In this model, that considers
correlated failures, a Core set of process never fails completely, and thus in every run the Survivor
set contains processes from each Core. Setting S to be a Core set ensures that it contains at least one
correct process and therefore has the same effect as a silent choir.
5 Conclusions
We have offered a novel approach to improving the performance of Byzantine consensus protocols. It
consists of a modular method that allows the protocol designer considerable control over the tradeoffs
between the behavior of the protocols in the common case and in the uncommon cases. A layer custom-
designed for the common case is prepended to a Byzantine consensus protocol, to provide the best
of both worlds. Our layer L2 achieves optimal decision time in the common case, in two rounds. Its
communication costs in this case are better by a factor of Ω(n) compared to all previously known
protocols that are similarly time-optimal. The layer L3 guarantees the best known common case bit
complexity, improving on the previously known protocols by a factor of 24. Finally, for the unanimous
common case the Layer L1 offers a solution that comes essentially at no cost. Even in the uncommon
cases, all of our layers add avery small constant number of rounds, andnegligible communication costs.
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While Byzantine protocols are designed to withstand extremely complex and challenging scenar-
ios, in most of their computations none of this materializes, and no failures occur. By diverting the
costs of handling complex challenges to the cases in which they actually occur, our layers allow to
reap considerable benefits in the normal course of events. These layers can be used to make Byzantine
fault-tolerance practically viable.
Our work is not the first to address efficiency in the common case in a modular fashion. Method-
ological approaches to handling the distinction between the common case and uncommon cases in
the shared-memory domain have been provided in influential works by Kogan, Petrank and Timnat
[21, 32]. In synchronous message-passing systems, our analysis shows that silent confirmation rounds
can be used to shift complexities from the common case to uncommon cases. We are certain that
other problem domains in distributed systems can benefit from a similar treatment.
An interesting question left open by our investigation concerns the precise upper and lower bounds
on the common-case bit complexity of Byzantine consensus protocols, and the tradeoff between rounds
and communication in this case. Despite the four decades of extensive research that have been de-
voted to consensus and Byzantine consensus, we believe that the field will never fail to raise new
interesting and practically relevant questions.
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A Pseudocode for L2 and L3
We start the appendix by providing the full pseudocode for the optimizing layers L2 and L3 from
Sections 3.2 and 3.3 respectively.
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time 0
∀i ∈ P:
(01) ∀j ∈ {0, 1, 2, ..., 2t} do
(02) if j mod 2 = vi then be silent % when vi = 0, send nothing to Even numbered processes %
(03) else send vi to j % when vi = 1, send nothing to Odd numbered processes %
time 1
∀j ∈ {0, 1, 2, ..., 2t}:
(04) valuesj [i] ←
{
j mod 2 if no message from i was received
(j + 1) mod 2 otherwise
}
(05) recj ←MAJ(valuesj)
(06) ∀i ∈ P
(07) if i mod 2 = recj then be silent % when recj = 0, send nothing to Even numbered processes %
(08) else send recj to i % when recj = 1, send nothing to Odd numbered processes %
time 2
∀i ∈ P:
(09) if received same recommendation rec from all {0, 1, ..., 2t} then esti ← rec; decide(esti) and be silent
(10) else % no identical recommendation %
(11) if more than t out of {0, 1, ..., 2t} recommended value rec then esti ← rec
(12) else esti ← vi % no legitimate recommendation %
(13) send ‘¡help! ’ to all
time 3 and beyond
∀i ∈ P:
(14) if no ‘¡help! ’ message received then halt
(15) else dec ← Base.Protocol(esti)
(16) if undecided after time 2 then decide(dec)
Figure 2: L2 – A layer for i that is optimally fast in the common case.
B Full Proofs
The proof of Theorem 1 makes use of the following lemma:
Lemma 1. Fix a run r of CC1 = L1 ⊙ Base.Protocol and let i be a correct process in r. If a correct
process i does not decide at time 1, then all the correct processes participate in the Base.Protocol
phase from time 1 on.
Observe that by line 03, a process that receives at least one ‘err ’ message participates in the base
protocol.
Proof. Let r and i satisfy the assumptions. By lines 03 and 04, if i is undecided at time 1 it received
at least t+ 1 ‘err ’ messages in the first round. At least one of them must be from a correct process,
who sent ‘err ’ to everyone. The claim follows.
Theorem 1. Let k ≥ 3 and let Base.Protocol be a binary consensus protocol for n > kt processes.
Then CC1 = L1 ⊙ Base.Protocol is a binary consensus protocol in which
1. In the unanimous common case, decisions occur after 1 round and no messages are sent, while
2. In the other cases, at most n2 bits are sent and 1 round elapses before reverting to the base
protocol.
Proof. We now prove that CC1 is a binary consensus protocol. Fix a run r of CC1. We show that r
satisfies Decision, Validity and Agreement:
Decision – Let i be a correct process in r. If i decides at time 1 we are done. If it doesn’t, then by
Lemma 1 all correct processes participate in the Base.Protocol phase. By the Decision property of
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time 0
∀i ∈ P:
(01) ∀j ∈ {0, 1, 2, ..., t} do
(02) if j mod 2 = vi then be silent % when vi = 0, send nothing to the even group %
(03) else send vi to j % when vi = 1, send nothing to the odd group %
time 1
∀j ∈ {0, 1, 2, ..., t}:
(04) valuesj [i] ←
{
j mod 2 if no message from i was received
(j + 1) mod 2 otherwise
}
(05) recj ←MAJ(valuesj)
(06) ∀i ∈ P
(07) if i mod 2 = recj then be silent % when recj = 0, send nothing to even processes %
(08) else send recj to i % when recj = 1, send nothing to odd processes %
time 2
∀i ∈ P:
(09) if received a unanimous recommendation rec from {0, 1, ..., t} then esti ← rec % send nothing %
(10) else esti ← vi; send ‘err ’ to all; % no legitimate recommendation %
time 3
∀i ∈ P:
(11) if did not receive any ‘err ’ then decide(esti) % send nothing %
(12) else send ‘¡help! ’ to all
time 4 and beyond
∀i ∈ P:
(13) if did not receive any ‘¡help! ’ then halt
(14) else dec← Base.Protocol(esti)
(15) if undecided after time 3 then decide(dec)
Figure 3: L3 – 3 rounds and nt bits in the common case.
Base.Protocol, process i completes the execution of line 07 and decides on line 08.
Validity – Assume that all correct processes propose the same value v in r. If v = 1, then every
correct process sends nothing in the first round by line 01 and therefore, a correct process receives at
most t ‘err ’ messages and decides 1 at time 1 (by lines 03 or 04). If on the other hand, v = 0, then
since n > 3t a correct process receives more than 2t ‘err ’ messages and therefore performs esti ← 0
at time 1 by line 06. All correct processes then start the base protocol with a proposal of 0 (line 07)
and by its Validity decide 0.
Agreement – let i, j ∈ P be correct processes in r. If both decide due to the base protocol they have
the same decision from its Validity. A correct process that decides at time 1 never changes its mind
and can only decide 1 (there is no 0 decisions at this time), therefore, if both i and j decide at time 1
they decide the same. We are left to show that if (w.l.o.g.) i decides at time 1 and j decides later
using the base protocol, then their decisions are the same. Since j is correct and undecided at time 1,
Lemma 1 states that all correct processes participate in the base protocol by line 07. Additionally,
since i decides at time 1 it decides 1. Hence, i received at most t ‘err ’ messages, which implies that
all correct processes received at most 2t ‘err ’ messages, performed est← 1 on line 05 and entered the
base protocol with est = 1. From Validity of the base protocol this ensures that j performed dec← 1
and thus j’s decision on line 08 is 1
1. In the unanimous common case, all processes propose 1 and no failures occur. Thus, at time 0
all is silent and no messages are sent. Consequently, at time 1 all processes receive no ‘err ’
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messages, and so they decide and halt without exchanging any messages.
2. An ‘err ’ message can be implemented using a single bit. In the worst case, every process sends
one bit to all others at time 0, incurring a total cost of n(n − 1) bits. After this, all remaining
communication is due to the base protocol.
The proofs of Theorems 2 and 3 make use of the following lemma:
Lemma 2. Fix a run r of CC2 = L2 ⊙ Base.Protocol (resp. CC3 = L3 ⊙ Base.Protocol). If a
correct process i does not decide at time 2 (resp. 3), then all the correct processes participate in the
Base.Protocol phase from time 3 on (resp. 4 on).
Proof. Let r and i satisfy the assumptions, and let j be a correct process in r. Line 09 of L2 (resp.
line 11 ofL3) implements a scr for the global fact all decided ,“all correct processes have decided” in
round 3 (resp. in round 4). Suitably, line 14 (resp. line 13) dictates that j halts and does not participate
in the base protocol only if j received no round 3 (resp. round 4) messages whatsoever. By line 14
(resp. 13) and Theorem 5 we have that j participates in the base protocol unless it knows at time 3
(resp. time 4) that all decidedwas true at time 2 (resp. 3). Since i does not decide at time 2 (resp. 3)
in r, then all decided is not true at time 2 (resp. 3). By the knowledge property, j does not know that
all decidedwas true at time 2 (resp. 3), because it is false. Consequently, no correct process j halts at
time 3 (resp. 4) in r, and they all participate in the Base.Protocol phase from time 3 (resp. 3) on.
Theorem 2. Let k ≥ 3 and let Base.Protocol be a binary consensus protocol for n > kt processes.
Then CC2 = L2 ⊙ Base.Protocol is a binary consensus protocol in which
1. In failure-free runs, decisions occur after 2 rounds and at most 2n(t+1) bits are communicated,
while
2. When failures occur, at most 2n(t + 1) + n2 bits are sent and 3 rounds elapse before reverting
to the base protocol.
3. In the common case, CC2 decides on the majority value.
Proof. We now prove that CC2 is a binary consensus protocol. Fix a run r of CC2. We show that r
satisfies Decision, Validity and Agreement:
Decision – Let i be a correct process in r. If i decides at time 2 we are done. If it doesn’t, then by
Lemma 2 all correct processes participate in the Base.Protocol phase. By the Decision property of
Base.Protocol, process i completes the execution of line 15 and decides on line 16.
Validity – Let i be a correct process in r and assume that all correct processes propose the same
value v. Recall that, since n > 3t by assumption, the correct processes consist of a strict majority.
By the pigeonhole principle, at least t + 1 processes from the greater Sanhedrin are correct. These
correct Sanhedrin members follow the protocol on lines 04 and 05 and compute the majority of votes
reported to them, which is v, thus, they recommend to all on v by lines 07 and 08. Thereafter, by
time 2, every correct process receives at least those t+1 recommendations on v and sets its estimation
to v either by line 09 (in case of a unanimous recommendation), or by line 11. If j decides at time 2, it
decides on its estimation v by line 09, and we are done. Assume it didn’t, then by Lemma 2 j and all
other correct process participate in the base protocol on line 15. As we have shown, the estimation of
all correct processes is set to v on lines 09 and 11. Thus, all correct processes enter the base protocol
with a proposal of v. From Validity of the base protocol, this ensures that j performs dec ← v on
line 15 and decides on v in line 16.
Agreement – Let i and j be correct processes in r. Assumew.l.o.g. that i does decides no later than j.
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If i does not decide at time 2 then both it and j participate in the base protocol and decide according
to it. In particular, their decisions satisfy Agreement. Let us assume that i decides at time 2 on v.
Specifically, line 09 is the only line in which a correct process decides at time 2. A correct process
(such as i) decides in line 09 iff it received a unanimous recommendation on v. Recall that every
unanimous recommendation includes a report of at least t+1 correct processes. It follows that every
correct process receives at least t+ 1 recommendations on v and therefore sets its estimation to v in
lines 09 or 11. Moreover, since no unanimous recommendation on u 6= v is possible, if j also decides
at time 2, then it decides on v as well, and Agreement holds. If j does not decide at time 2, then,
by Lemma 2, all correct processes participate in the Base.Protocol phase. And, since all correct
processes fixed their estimations to v at time 2, they all enter the base protocol with est = v. The
Validity of the base protocol ensures that j will decide on the value v in line 16, ensuring Agreement.
1. In a failure-free run at time 0 every process transmits its proposal to half of the Sanhedrin by
silence and the other half by messages. Sanhedrin members have one less message to send in
half the cases (to themselves), thus at most a total of n⌈(2t + 1)/2⌉ − ⌊(2t + 1)/2⌋ ≤ n(t+ 1)
bits are sent during the first round. Since no failures occurMAJ(valuesj) is the same for every
Sanhedrin member j ∈ {0, ..., 2t} and they all recommend the same value v =MAJ(values).
At time 1, by lines 07 and 08, Sanhedrin members send their recommendations on v to half
of the processes by silence and the other half by messages. Thus, sending at most a total of
(2t + 1)⌈(n − 1)/2⌉ ≤ n(t + 1) bits in the second round. The unanimous recommendation of
the second round causes every i ∈ P to decide v at time 2 by line 09, remain silent in round 3
and halt at time 3 by line 14.
2. Again, correct processes send their proposals to the Sanhedrin at a cost of at most n(t+1) bits in
the first round, and correct Sanhedrin members send their recommendations to processes with
a total cost of at most n(t+1) bits in the second round. The difference lays in the third round,
when correct processes may not receive a unanimous recommendation and would therefore send
¡help! messages (that ca be implemented using a single bit) by line 13. This costs in the worst
case n(n− 1) bits. After this, all remaining communication is due to the base protocol.
3. In the common case of a failure-free run, all processes transmit their proposals according to pro-
tocol at time 0 and a Sanhedrin member calculates their majority at time 1 on lines 04 and 05.
The majority value v is unique and therefore all Sanhedrin members send the same recommen-
dations on v by lines 07 and 08 at time 1. All processes receive the unanimous recommendation
on v by time 2 and therefore decide on it in line 09.
Theorem 3. Let k ≥ 3 and let Base.Protocol be a binary consensus protocol for n > kt processes.
Then CC3 = L3 ⊙ Base.Protocol is a binary consensus protocol in which
1. In failure-free runs, decisions occur after 3 rounds and at most n(t+1.5) bits are communicated,
while
2. When failures occur, at most n(t+1.5) + 2n2 bits are sent and 4 rounds elapse before reverting
to the base protocol.
3. In the common case, CC3 decides on the majority value.
Proof. We now prove that CC3 is a binary consensus protocol. Fix a run r of CC3. We show that r
satisfies Decision, Validity and Agreement:
Decision – Let i be a correct process in r. If i decides at time 3 we are done. If it doesn’t, then by
Lemma 2 all correct processes participate in the base protocol. By the Decision property of the base
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protocol, process i completes the execution of line 14 and decides on line 15.
Validity – Let i be a correct process in r and assume that all correct processes propose the same
value v. Recall that, since n > 3t by assumption, the correct processes consist of a strict majority. By
the pigeonhole principle, at least one process jc ∈ {0, 1, 2, ..., t} is correct. Process jc follows the pro-
tocol and at time 1 on lines 04 and 05 it computes that the majority of votes as reported to it. Denote
this value v. Consequently, by lines 07 and 08 jc recommends on v in the second round. Thereafter, at
time 2 every correct process receives jc’s recommendation on v and therefore sets its estimation to v
(est← v), either in line 09 due to a unanimous recommendation, or in line 10 because its own initial
value is v. If i decides at time 3, by line 11 it decides on its estimation, which we have established is v.
The only other option for i to decide is on line 15 by using the base protocol. It remains to show that
if i decides using the base protocol, then its decision is also v. Assume that i decides using the base
protocol. Since i is a correct process that does not decide at time 3, by Lemma 2 all correct processes
participate in the base protocol. As we have shown, the estimation of every correct process is set to v
at time 2 by lines 09 and 10, and so all correct processes enter the base protocol on line 14 at time 4
with the proposal v. The Validity of the base protocol ensures that i sets dec← v on line 14 and that
i decides v on line 15. Hence, we are done.
Agreement – Let i and j be correct processes in r. Assume w.l.o.g. that i decides no later than j. If i
does not decide at time 3 then both it and j participate in the base protocol and decide according to
it. In particular, their decisions satisfy Agreement. Let’s assume that i decides at time 3 on a value v.
Protocol CC3 implements a silent confirmation round for the global fact ϕ¯c ,“a unanimous recom-
mendation was received by all correct processes” in round 3 (lines 09 and 10). The scr information
transfer guarantees of Theorem 5 and by line 11 at time 3, imply that i decides at time 3 only if ϕ¯c was
true at time 2. In particular,if i decides by line 11, it decides on its estimate value (esti = v). Recall
that every unanimous recommendation includes at least one correct process’ recommendation which
it recommended to all. It follows that if two correct processes receive unanimous recommendations,
then these recommendations are the same. Thus, the scr(ϕ¯c) in round 3 informs i that all correct
processes have their estimations set to v. If j also decides at time 3, line 11, then it decides on its
estimation v, and Agreement holds. If j does not decide at time 3, then, by Lemma 2, all correct
processes participate in base protocol. Moreover, since all correct processes have the same estimate v,
they all propose v to the base protocol in line 14. Validity of the base protocol guarantees that dec ← v
in line 14 and j decides v by line 15, ensuring Agreement.
1. In a failure-free run at time 0 every process transmits its proposal to half of the Council by si-
lence and to the other half by messages. Council members have one less message to send in half
the cases (to themselves), thus at most a total of n⌈(t+1)/2⌉ − ⌊(t+ 1)/2⌋ ≤ n(t+2)/2− t/2
bits are sent during the first round. Since no failures occur MAJ(valuesj) is the same for
every council member j ∈ {0, ..., t} and they all recommend the same value v =MAJ(values).
At time 1, lines 07 and 08, council members send their recommendation on v to half of the
processes by silence and to the other half by messages. Thus, sending at most a total of
(t+1)⌈(n−1)/2⌉ ≤ n(t+1)/2 bits in the second round. The unanimous recommendation on v
of the second round causes every i ∈ P to set its estimate to esti ← v at time 2, and remain silent
in round 3. Thus, in the common case, no message is sent in round 3. At time 3, no message
is received and in particular no ‘err ’ message, therefore, every process decides on its estimate,
remains quiet in round 4 and halts at time 4. In conclusion, the total number of messages/bits
sent in a failure-free run of CC3 is at most n(t+ 2)/2 − t/2 + n(t+ 1)/2 < n(t+ 1.5).
2. Again, correct processes send their proposals to the council at a cost of at most n(t+2)/2− t/2
bits in the first round, and correct council members send their recommendations to processes
with a total cost of at most n(t+1)/2 bits in the second round. The difference lays in the third
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and fourth rounds, when correct processes may not receive a unanimous recommendation and
would therefore send ‘err ’ messages by line 10 in the third round and ¡help! messages by line 12
in the fourth round (each message can be implemented using a single bit). In the worst case,
this adds a cost of 2n(n− 1) bits in rounds 3 and 4. After this, starting at time 4, all remaining
communication is due to the base protocol.
3. In the common case of a failure-free run, all processes transmit their proposals according to
protocol at time 0. A council member calculates the correct majority value v at time 1 on
lines 04 and 05. The majority value v is unique and therefore all council members send the
same recommendation v at time 1 by lines 07 and 08. All processes receive the unanimous
recommendation on v by time 2 and therefore set their estimation to v by line 09 and remain
silent. In round 3, no messages are sent in the common case, in particular no ‘err ’ messages.
Therefore, every process decides in line 11 on its estimate v which is the majority value.
C Multivalued Layers
In multi-valued consensus, |V | ≥ 3 and the splitting technique used by L2 and L3 for broadcasting
values needs to bemodified. The resulting technique becomesmore cumbersome and less efficient. We
design two layers L′2 and L
′
3 for multi-valued consensus that closely resemble L2 and L3, respectively.
The new layers differ from the original ones in two minor ways. One is that the majority computation
on line 05 of the original layers is replaced by a plurality computation, which chooses a value that
appears most frequently. The other difference is that the broadcasting of values is implemented in a
more straightforward manner: In both the first and second rounds, processes encode by silence only a
common proposal v˜i and decision d˜ec, while broadcasting the rest of the values explicitly. No further
changes are needed. Figures 4 and 5 shows L′2 and L
′
3. The function PLUR(·) : V
n → V is defined:
PLUR(v) , most common v in v with some arbitrary tie breaker.
Theorem 4. Let k ≥ 3, let Base.Protocol be a multi-valued consensus protocol for n > kt, and let
L ∈ {L2, L3}. Then CC
′ = L′ ⊙ Base.Protocol is a multi-valued consensus protocol in which
1. In failure-free runs of L′2 (resp. L
′
3) decisions occur after 2 (resp. 3) rounds and at most
4n(t+ 1) log2 |V | (resp. 2n(t+ 1) log2 |V |) bits are communicated, while
2. When failures occur, at most 4n(t+1) log2 |V |+n
2 (resp. 2n(t+1) log2 |V |+2n
2) bits are sent
and 3 (resp. 4) rounds elapse before reverting to the base protocol.
3. In the common case, CC′ decides on a plurality value.
Proving CC2′ (resp. CC3′) is a consensus protocol stems directly from the proof for CC2 in Theo-
rem 2 (resp. CC3 inTheorem 3). The only minor modification is in Validity, replacing majority with
plurality. However, since when all correct processes propose the same value v both plurality and
majority have the same result. Therefore, Validity is maintained for the multi-valued as well. We are
thus left only with proving the rest:
Proof. (for CC2′)
1. In a failure-free run at time 0 every process transmits its proposal to all Sanhedrin members
by messages or silence (a messages can encode any value by at most log2 |V | bits). Sanhedrin
members have one less message to send (to themselves). A message encodes a value by log2 |V |
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bits. Thus a total of at most (n − 1)(2t+ 1) log2 |V | bits are sent during the first round. Since
no failures occur PLUR(valuesj) is the same for every Sanhedrin member j ∈ {0, ..., 2t} and
they all recommend the same value v = PLUR(values). At time 1, Sanhedrin members send
their recommendations on v to all processes. Thus, sending at most (2t+1)(n− 1) log2 |V | bits
in the second round. The unanimous recommendation of the second round causes every i ∈ P
to decide v at time 2 by line 07, remain silent in round 3 and halt at time 3 by line 12.
2. Again, correct processes send their proposals to the Sanhedrin at a cost of at most (n− 1)(2t+
1) log2 |V | bits in the first round, and correct Sanhedrin members send their recommendations
to processes with a cost of atmost (2t+1)(n−1) log2 |V | bits in the second round. The difference
lays in the third round, when correct processes may not receive a unanimous recommendation
andwould therefore send ¡help! messages (that can be implemented using a single bit) by line 11.
This costs in the worst case n(n − 1) bits. After this, all remaining communication is due to
the base protocol.
3. In the common case of a failure-free run, all processes transmit their proposals according to pro-
tocol at time 0 and a Sanhedrin member calculates their plurality at time 1 on lines 03 and 04.
The plurality value v is unique and (a known tie-breaker exists), therefore all Sanhedrin mem-
bers send the same recommendations on v by lines 05 and 06 at time 1. All processes receive
the unanimous recommendation on v by time 2 and therefore decide on it in line 07.
Proof. (for CC3′)
1. In a failure-free run at time 0 every process sends its proposal the council by messages or si-
lence (a messages can encode any value by at most log2 |V | bits). Council members have one
less message to send (to themselves), thus at most (n − 1)(t + 1) log2 |V | bits are sent during
the first round. Since no failures occur PLUR(valuesj) is the same for every council mem-
ber j ∈ {0, ..., t} and they all recommend the same value v = PLUR(values). At time 1,
lines 05 and 06, council members send their recommendation on v to all the processes. Thus,
sending at most (t+ 1)(n− 1) log2 |V | bits in the second round. The unanimous recommenda-
tion on v of the second round causes every i ∈ P to set its estimate to esti ← v at time 2, and
remain silent in round 3. Thus, in the common case, no message is sent in round 3. At time 3,
no message is received and in particular no ‘err ’ message, therefore, every process decides on
its estimate, remains quiet in round 4 and halts at time 4.
2. Again, correct processes send their proposals to the council at a cost of at most (n − 1)(t +
1) log2 |V | bits in the first round, and correct council members send their recommendations to
processes with a total cost of at most (t + 1)(n − 1) log2 |V | bits in the second round. The
difference lays in the third and fourth rounds, when correct processes may not receive a unan-
imous recommendation and would therefore send ‘err ’ messages by line 08 in the third round
and ¡help! messages by line 10 in the fourth round (each message can be implemented using a
single bit). In the worst case, this adds a cost of 2n(n − 1) bits in rounds 3 and 4. After this,
starting at time 4, all remaining communication is due to the base protocol.
3. In the common case of a failure-free run, all processes transmit their proposals according to
protocol at time 0 and a council member calculates their plurality at time 1 on lines 03 and 04.
The plurality value v is unique and (a known tie-breaker exists), therefore all council members
send the same recommendations on v by lines 05 and 06 at time 1. All processes receive the
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unanimous recommendation on v by time 2 and by line 07 set their estimate to v and remain
silent. Thereafter, at time 3 by line 09 the processes decide on v.
time 0
∀i ∈ P:
(01) if vi = v˜i then be silent % v˜i – a common proposal of i %
(02) else send vi to processes {0, 1, 2, ..., 2t} % vi 6= v˜i %
time 1
∀j ∈ {0, 1, 2, ..., 2t}:
(03) valuesj [i] ←
{
v˜i if no message from i was received
proposal received from i otherwise
}
(04) recj ← PLUR(valuesj) % d˜ec – a common plurality result %
(05) if recj = d˜ec then be silent % recommendation on d˜ec %
(06) else send recj to all % recommendation on recj 6= d˜ec %
time 2
∀i ∈ P:
(07) if received same recommendation rec from all {0, 1, ..., 2t} then esti ← rec; decide(esti) and be silent
(08) else % no unanimous recommendation %
(09) if more than t out of {0, 1, ..., 2t} recommended value rec then esti ← rec
(10) else esti ← vi % no legitimate recommendation %
(11) send ‘¡help! ’ to all
time 3 and beyond
∀i ∈ P:
(12) if no ‘¡help! ’ message received then halt
(13) else dec← Base.Protocol(esti)
(14) if undecided after time 2 then decide(dec)
Figure 4: L′2 – The greater Sanhedrin multi-valued variant.
In multi-valued consensus, the decision value domain is commonly defined as V ∪{⊥}, where⊥ is
some default value. A key difference between binary and multivalued consensus is that in the latter
it is sometimes impossible to guarantee that processes decide on a correct process’ proposal. More
precisely, if n|V | ≤ t then it is not always possible to guarantee that in every execution we decide on
some correct proposal. Consider a failure-free run r where at most t processes propose the same value
and let the decision value in that run be v ∈ V , a proposal made by a correct process in r. Denote
by Sv the set of processes that proposed v in r. We construct the run r
′ where all processes have the
same initial values as in r except those in Sv which start with some other initial value v
′ 6= v. In
addition, the processes in Sv are faulty in r
′ (|Sv | ≤ t), and perform the same actions as in r, e.g.,
proposing v. For all correct processes the runs are indistinguishable and they must decide on v, a
value that no correct process proposed.
Many multivalued Byzantine protocols circumvent this issue by a strong tendency to decide on
the default value ⊥. In a practical sense, deciding on ⊥ usually means a “no-op” or a “blank” result.
Our multivalued layers do not produce such an effect. On the contrary, they allow a designer to
improve her solution’s time and communication costs while also emulating a fair plurality voting in
the common case.
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time 0
∀i ∈ P:
(01) if vi = v˜i then be silent % v˜i – a common proposal of i %
(02) else send vi to processes {0, 1, 2, ..., t} % vi 6= v˜i %
time 1
∀j ∈ {0, 1, 2, ..., t}:
(03) valuesj [i] ←
{
v˜i if no message from i was received
proposal received from i otherwise
}
(04) recj ← PLUR(valuesj) % d˜ec – a common plurality result %
(05) if recj = d˜ec then be silent % recommendation on d˜ec %
(06) else send recj to all % recommendation on recj 6= d˜ec %
time 2
∀i ∈ P:
(07) if received a unanimous recommendation rec from {0, 1, ..., t} then esti ← rec % send nothing %
(08) else esti ← vi; send ‘err ’ to all; % no legitimate recommendation %
time 3
∀i ∈ P:
(09) if did not receive any ‘err ’ then decide(esti) % send nothing %
(10) else send ‘¡help! ’ to all
time 4 and beyond
∀i ∈ P:
(11) if did not receive any ‘¡help! ’ then halt
(12) else dec ← Base.Protocol(esti)
(13) if undecided after time 3 then decide(dec)
Figure 5: L′3 – The smaller Council Multivalued variant.
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